Cali podint èssiri is resurtaus po nosu de custa fini de s’Ocidenti, aici atropelliada? Nosatrus puru, ke sa Groenlàndia (o su Rojava, su Kùrdistan sirianu) seus territòriu autònomu de unu Istadu fraigadu a ingìriu de un’etnia dominadora, siat issa italiana, danesa, o arabbu-siriana. A diferèntzia de is Kurdus, no teneus una rapresentàntzia indipendenti, e aici etotu comenti a is Groenlandesus, eus bìviu po decènnius in subalternidadi sulena, bendendi su benidori nostru po pagu-pagu de assistèntzias.
No totus is trumbullus internatzionalis podint èssiri de profetu po is Natzionis kentza istadu. Sa fini de sa Grandu Gherra at tirau a su nascimentu de medas Istadus acapiaus a Natzionis (pensaus a ìs de s’Europa Orientali), e sà de sa Segunda Gherra at spintu a sa primu decolonizatzioni, ki però at betiu a Istadus kentze acàpiu a Natzionis: territòrius colonialis beçus furriaus a Istadus. S’implosioni de s’impèriu sovièticu at donau un’atra spinta manna a sa nàscida de Istadus basaus a pithus de natzionis kentza istadu.
Oindìi, sa fini de s’Ocidenti, ghiada e acelerada de su Don Kixote de Mar-a-Lago, tenit unus cantus caràteris:
Comenti custu trumbullu cuntemporàneu agatat a nosatrus?
In Sardigna, a sa fini de is annus ’70 de su sèculu de XX, de su preustinu de s’àrburi antiga de su sardismu, de custu fundu fatu de federalismu e de autonomismu, s’est comintzada a pesai sa mata noa de su neosardismu, e a pustis, crescendi, de s’indipendentismu. Filla de medas babbus e de medas mamas. Çertu, de su sardismu gloriosu de Lussu e Bellieni, ma puru de sa dissidèntzia de su PCI (e bastat a regordare a Antonello Satta, Eliseo Spiga e Gianfranco Pintore), de su catoliçismu progressista (Juanni Lilliu), etc. Fiat custu unu pensamentu de sa crisi, ki circât de respùndiri a su fallimentu terrìbili de sa Rinascita.
Custus intelletualis, mancai nci apant provau cun s’imprenta (regordaus jornalis bilinguis ke Su pòpulu sardu, Natzione sarda etc.) no sunt rennèscius a revesciai s’egemonia curturali modernizadora de tandu, ca ant pèrdiu sa partida de s’Universidadi, inui no funti intraus, e de s’imprenta e de is atrus mèdia ki fiant nascendi tandu (totu partidas bintas de sa curtura “unionista”, bastat a pensai a su sucessu de is ràdiu e televisionis “lìberas” de Grauso, etc. Po no contai de s’informàtica e de sa dijitalizatzioni). Issus ant tentu comuncu unu grandu ròlliu comenti minorias ativas. Po mori de is contestatzionis insoru, ant betiu a su poddeu de s’ajenda polìtica temas ke s’ocupatzioni militari, sa monocultura petrolkìmica ki si fiant gherraus de nos impònniri, su disterru de is Sardus, e sa fura de sa limba nostra.
Si funti però scontraus cunduna incapaçidadi bastanti manna a pesai un’organizatzioni, cumparthendi puru un’utopismu comunitarista, antiurbanu, e atesu de su mudonju antropolòjicu ki at fatu de su Sardu – pròpiu in cuddus annus – atra cosa cunforma a sù ki s’imajinânt issus, idealizendi-ddu e essentzializendi-ddu. S’indipendentismu s’est tropu stesiau de su Sardu comunu bivendi prus ki totu in is periferias urbanas, e de is problemas suus. In custu influentzau de curturas minoritàrias ki no funti stètias bonas a costruiri casi nudda: ne organizatzioni, ma nemancu una ràdiu in sardu e una sfida a s’italianizatzioni linguìstica fortzada ki biveus. S’indipendentismu si pensat ancora a oindìi comenti un’avanguàrdia e càstiat a su pòpulu comenti ki fessat indun’istadu de minoridadi, abetendi de èssiri illuminau, opuru ghetende-ndi nexi a no s’èssiri pesau, a no àiri fatu nudda contra de sa cunditzioni sua, e prus ki totu a no àiri sighiu sa ghia insoru. Custu intzullat s’ego de is dirigentis indipendentistas, ma stèsiat meda de sa jenti e de is vidas trumbulladas ki sa jenti bivit.
De cudda crisi est nàsciu però s’indipendentismu modernu, antiçipadu jenialmenti de Antoni Simòn Mossa, a dolu mannu mortu in su 1971. Simòn Mossa, gràtzias puru a sa crìtica a sa forma ratzionalista in arkitetura, bivendi in Thàthari, çentru polìticu de s’ideolojia modernizadora de sa Rinascita, est stètiu s’ùnicu (a pustis de Antoni Gramsci) a cumprèndiri ki sa kistioni no fiat s’arretradesa nostra, ma ki custa fiat invecis s’efetu de sa therakia sunfria asuta de s’Itàlia. Simòn Mossa est sa contra de su pensadori mannu de s’Autonomia, fascista de formatzione e fascista de coru, Pìgliaru, ki torrât totus is problemas nostros a un’essèntzia de spèrdiri, s’identidadi arretrada benendi de ìs ki tzerriât “noi pastori”, “nosatrus is pastoris”. Po Simòn Mossa sa respusta fiat s’indipendèntzia, e sa liberatzione. Po Pìgliaru sa modernizatzioni fortzada e s’italianizatzioni (postas una cun s’atra a s’inprùs).
Sa sensibilidadi de Simòn Mossa fiat assenti in Ànghelu Caria e in ìs ki si funti agataus a su cumentzu de sa stòria de s’indipendentismu modernu, in is annus Setanta e Otanta de su sèculu passau. Benendi de is grupus ki tandu tzerriâmus “extraparlamentaris”, teniat un’acàpiu prus istrintu cun is cumbatas de cuddu tempus, ma prus pagu visioni jenerali. Su neosardismu e, a pustis, s’indipendentismu, est abarrau marcau po fàiri, comente si cantât tandu, “ke a sos Bascos e ke a sos Catalanos”. “Ke a is Sardus”, mancu s’umbra. No fiat una pràtica polìtica situada e ki partiat de s’esperièntzia sarda. Custu at bòfiu nâi ki su mollu fiat a nde revesciai su podèriu e ddi pònniri in logu suu su podèriu nostru (de custas ghias abistas): duncas, su Stadu sardu, sa Repùbrica de Sardigna, e atrus projetus dirijistas. Torrendi a piscai totu su pensamentu de sa prima parti de su sèculu de XX. Sa cosa, evidentementi, no at funtzionau: sa jenti no at sighiu, e duncas is Indipendentistas oindì no funti bonus a ghiai nisciuna atzioni polìtica ki pothat favorèssiri s’indipendèntzia.
E no at funtzionau nemancu in foras de sa Sardigna, inue ddoi funti organizatzionis indipendentistas prus fortis. A costituiri Istadus nous partendi de is Natzionis kena Istadu nc’ant pensau in medas in Europa. Tocat a nâi ki su fallimentu prus mannu e spetaculari est stètiu sù de su procès cadelanu. Ma puru su Referendum iscotzesu no est andau beni, e aici etotu su “confederalismu democràticu” kurdu oindìi in Sìria. Sendi caminus de durada longa, no est nâu ki sa partida si nci siat serrada. A dònnia manera, imoi s’est serrada, e si nc’est serrada pròpiu in su puntu de sa statualidadi. Sa statualidadi est polìtica ma produsit curtura, pertinèntzia, destinus, amesturus. Jerarkizaus, inui donniunu depit abarrai in logu suu (e difatis is Sardus depint èssiri folklori, “mistèriu”, “identitidadi” essentzializada, no tenint deretu a una stòria e a èssiri sù ki sunt), ma is conseguèntzias funti rialis politicamenti, comenti podeus biiri a oindìi in Groenlàndia.
Po dd’acabai, no creu ki custu momentu siat bonu po scallai custas istruturas artifiçialis ki funti is Istadus de su bàsciu, partendi de is Natzionis kentza Istadu ke sa nostra, comenti Maurizio Onnis fiat inditendi. Custu est unu momentu de restauratzioni de custus Istadus. Ki no tenit sentidu e no tenit benidori, a pàrriri miu, ca custus Istadus ki arribant de s’antigòriu no funti bonus a manijai e a risolviri is problemas de su mundu, ki funti sèmpiri de prus pranetàrius. Funti acapiaus puru a sa manera de prodùsiri, de consumai, de trasportai, e de imajinai ki no funti bonus a manijai pròpiu po nudda. Ma is oligarkias dda biint a manera diversa.
Sa respusta podit èssiri difatis oligàrkica e imperiali, est a nâi reatzionària e predatòria, opuru podit arribai de un’afortiamentu de istruturas polìticas subranatzionalis ke s’Europa nostra, ki mènguant is làcanas e donint logu a is natzionis kena istadu puru. A dognunu de scioberai sa parti ki preferit.
NODA
Scioberus ortogràficus PERSONALIS.
No est fàçili a scriri in sardu po nemus, e deu m’agatu beni aici. Creu ki si cumprendat. Pensu ki ddoi siant lìmitis in custa scriitura puru, ma su disiju est de no mi intendi in limba allena, scriendi in sardu, e puru de provai a inditai calincuna solutzioni a kini traballat a pithus de sa manera de scriiri. Partu de sa kistionada mia, ma seu abistu ki unus cantus sonus càmbiant a manera regulari in atras kistionadas. Po custu ponju sinnus gràficus astratus candu su cambiamentu est regulari. Jenti meda s’est kesciada de comenti scriu. Piçocus, tenei passèntzia e cumpadessei:
Â, â inditat una a longa, mascamenti in su tempus passau contìnuu de is verbus (ki in italianu tzèrriant “imperfetto”) e in su verbu narai.
C, c podit èssiri lìjia /č/ opuru /k/ segundu sa zona de Sardigna (ke in centu, cida, cerèsia, etc.)
Ç, ç podit èssiri lìjia /č/ opuru /ts/ segundu sa zona de Sardigna (ke in açapu, sconçu, fàçili)
J, j podit èssiri lìjia /gi-/ opuru /dz/ opuru /i/ segundu sa zona de Sardigna (ke in Junta, rejoni, culurjoni, etc.)
Ll, ll podint èssiri lìjias /gi-/ opuru /dz/ opuru /ll/ opuru fintzas /ts/ segundu sa zona de Sardigna (ke Cunsillu, filla, allu, ollu, etc.)
X, x podit èssiri lìjia /ž/ opuru /gh/ segundu sa zona de Sardigna (ke in paxė, nuxė, luxė, etc.)
Th, th podit èssiri lìjia /th/ opuru /t/ opuru /ts/ opuru /č/ segundu sa zona de Sardigna (ke in pratha, petha, theracu, etc.).
[Ė, ė si podiat lìjiri /e/ opuru /i/ in s’acabu de fueddus meda. Ma dd’apu postu feti in is tìtulus. Una solutzionė ki dd’assimbillit si podiat agatai po sa o in s’acabu de fueddus ke domo/domu, oro/oru, e in is pluralis masculinus. Un’atra possibilidadi interessanti ‘iat èssiri a fàiri de G,g unu sonu ùnicu, /gh/, de Y,y 🡪 /y/ e de K,k 🡪 /k/. Ma no m’atrivu tropu].
Dònnia crìtica est beni arriçida!
What might be the outcome of this messy End of the West for stateless nations such as Sardinia? Like Greenland (or Rojava, Syrian Kurdistan), we too are an autonomous territory within an state, built around a dominant ethnicity—Italian in our case, Danish or Arab-Syrian in the other examples mentioned above. Unlike the Kurds of Rojava, we have no independent political representation; but like Greenlanders, we have lived for decades in a condition of quiet subalternity, trading our destiny for a certain degree of welfare.
Not every international turmoil proves fruitful for stateless nations such as ours. At the end of the Great War, many new states were created, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, often linked to pre-existing nations. The end of World War II led to the creation of new states through decolonization, rarely grounded in nations, but rather consisting of former colonial territories that became states. The implosion of the Soviet empire provided yet another major impulse for the creation of new states based on previously stateless nations.
Today, the end of the West—led and accelerated by the Mar-a-Lago Don Quixote—has several defining features:
(a) It is a Restorative Revolution of traditional nation-states, aimed at re-hierarchizing them beneath a small number of imperial or hegemonic states (the United States, Russia, China, and Israel in the Middle East). It was anticipated by movements such as the Northern League in Italy, the National Front in France, and Brexit in the United Kingdom, all driven by the loss of their own territorial privileges in a period of globalization and decolonization.
(b) It produces “neo-patrimonial regimes”. To recall Max Weber’s classical theory of power, these regimes combine elements of legal-rational authority, personal leadership (as in Trvmp, Berlusconi, Pvtin, etc.), patronage (the distribution of resources to loyal clients), and the systematic confusion of public and private spheres (as evident in the families of Trvmp, Pvtin, and Berlusconi). These characteristics were once considered typical of so-called “backward” societies, yet they are clearly present—today and historically—in so-called “advanced” societies as well. This reveals the profound limits of classical dichotomous models based on the “tradition/modernity” matrix, which has often been weaponized to stigmatize peoples such as the Sardinians as “backward.” It is now evident that this matrix is analytically worthless.
(c) The collapse of the neoliberal and reformist dream, as a consequence of the crisis that began in 2008. State intervention in markets following the financial bubble’s explosion was the strongest in decades of proclaimed economic “liberalism.” In Europe, it was the EU—rather than the already artificial nation-states—that intervened first. As a result, many illusions faded: the withdrawal of the state from the economy, faith in market self-regulation and self-balancing (an abstraction in itself). Nevertheless, reactionary segments of the ruling classes continued to resist state intervention against inequality and poverty, and against strengthening public healthcare, education, and welfare systems.
(d) The planetary crisis—marked by both the spread of COVID-19 and climate change—has generated the need for a “green transition” toward cleaner energy. States have largely proven unfit to confront it. Supporters of the Restorative Revolution—right- and left-wing nostalgics of a stronger nation-state—have adopted three main strategies: denial (COVID-19 and climate change are portrayed as inventions), war against science, and make marginal territories (such as Sardinia) pay for it. Their retroverted worldview is structurally incapable of addressing problems that are planetary in scale. These crises concern not only human beings, but also the earth, water, air, space, and life itself. National political elites, however, prioritize consensus. Unable to solve these problems, they prefer to dismiss them as fake or to attack scientists. Otherwise, they resort to another well-known instrument for maintaining consensus: war.
How does this contemporary turmoil affect our small stateless nation?
In Sardinia, between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, so-called Neo-Sardism emerged, followed by Independentism, both growing from the old trunk of Sardism: a mass political movement born after the First World War and imbued with federalism, autonomism, and social progress. Independentism originated not only from historical Sardism, but also from dissidents coming from Socialist, Communist, and Catholic (Christian Democratic) parties. This was a period of deep crisis, particularly of the Sardinia-wide development plan known as “Rinascita”, implemented by Italy in a patronizing and top-down manner. It showed little interest in developing the local economy and instead imposed parts of the Italian petrochemical industry on the island. After the 1973 oil crisis, this project failed and left Sardinia environmentally and socially devastated. Neo-Sardist intellectuals were unable to reverse the “modernizing” cultural hegemony of the time and remained almost entirely outside academia, mainstream media, and the emerging digital media, which developed dramatically in Sardinia during the 1990s. Nevertheless, their role as an active minority was important in several fields. Through their contestation, they introduced into the political agenda themes such as military occupation, the attempted petrochemical monoculture, mass Sardinian emigration (disterru), and linguistic dispossession.
However, they were unable to build a solid organization. Moreover, they shared an anti-urban, communitarian utopianism that distanced them from the profound anthropological transformation that was dramatically reshaping Sardinian society during those very years. Sardinians were becoming something quite different from the idealized—and essentialist—image held by these movements. Independentism increasingly distanced itself from ordinary Sardinians, who mainly lived in urban peripheries and faced concrete social problems. Rather than proposing solutions, its main feature became protest combined with a ruralist dream. Like many minority political cultures, it failed to build grassroots institutions or organizations—or even something as basic as a radio station in the Sardinian language—and it did not seriously challenge the forced Italianization experienced by the Sardinian people. To this day, Independentism tends to see itself as an avant-garde and to regard the people as a passive mass in a condition of minority, waiting for enlightenment, or else as culpable for not being “awake” or for not following its leadership. This flatters the ego of Independentist leaders, but it creates distance from ordinary people and their difficult lives.
Compared to the vision anticipated by Antoni Simon Mossa, Sardinian Independentism emerged from this flawed cradle. Simon Mossa, who unfortunately died in 1971, was a brilliant architect engaged in the critique of rationalism. Living in Thàthari/Sassari—the political center of the modernizing ideology hegemonic in the 1950s and 1960s—he was the only thinker after the largely forgotten Antonio Gramsci to understand that Sardinia’s problem was not “backwardness” itself, but that this condition was the effect of Italian domination. He stood in sharp opposition to the great theorist of autonomism, Antoni Pìgliaru. With a fascist background and sensibility, yet fully integrated into the hegemonic “modernizing” Left, Pìgliaru traced Sardinia’s problems back to an essence that had to be erased: a supposedly “typical” backward identity characterizing what he called a “we-shepherds” society. For Simon Mossa, the answer was independence and liberation; for Pìgliaru, it was forced modernization and Italianization—often merged.
Simon Mossa’s deep awareness was almost entirely absent in Ànghelu Caria and other leaders of the new Independentism of the 1970s and 1980s. Coming from what were then called extra-parliamentary political groups, they were closely linked to the struggles of that period but had a much narrower overall vision. Independentism, emerging from Neo-Sardism, retained an abstract approach. A famous song proclaimed that Sardinians should act ke a sos Bascos e ke a sos Catalanos (“like the Basques and the Catalans”). This was not a situated political thought rooted in Sardinian experience and practice, but rather an imported and utopian one. The dominant political model was to replace Italian—or Italian-subaltern—power with “the power of the Sardinian people”, represented by an enlightened leadership. This implied the creation of a Sardinian state—the Republic of Sardinia—or similar top-down projects. An early twentieth-century worldview dominated this imagination. Unsurprisingly, this movement failed, and its projects did not succeed.
This approach failed beyond Sardinia as well. Many stronger European movements attempted to create new states based on historical stateless nations. The most dramatic failure was the 2017 Catalan procés. The 2014 Scottish referendum also failed, and today we are witnessing the severe crisis of Kurdish Democratic Confederalism in Syria. As long-term phenomena, these processes cannot be declared definitively over. However, at present, this path is effectively closed—specifically at the point of statehood. Statehood is a political phenomenon, but it produces culture, belonging, and destinies. It produces hierarchies, and everyone is assigned a place. Sardinians, for instance, are expected to mirror themselves in images of tradition, “mystery”, and essentialized identity. They are denied the right simply to be themselves. Yet belonging to a state has very real consequences, especially in political terms, as today we can observe in Greenland.
To conclude, I do not believe this moment is favorable for dismantling artificial structures known as states, starting from stateless nations like ours. This is, rather, a moment of restoration of nation-states. I personally believe these structures have no future and are ultimately meaningless, because they are incapable of managing and solving our increasingly planetary problems, that are tied to modes of production, consumption, mobility, and imaginaries that these States can no longer govern. But oligarchies think differently.
The response can be oligarchic and imperial—that is, reactionary and predatory— indeed, or it can come from a strengthening of supranational political structures, such as Europe, reducing the significance of borders and creating space for stateless nations as well. Let everyone choose the side they prefer.
Imàgine: huffingtonpost.it
